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Abstract
This is the ﬁrst paper on consumer search where the cost of go-
ing back to stores already searched is explicitly taken into account.
We show that the optimal sequential search rule under costly second
visits is very diﬀerent from the traditional reservation price rule in
that it is nonstationary and not independent of previously sampled
prices. We explore the implications of costly second visits on market
equilibrium in two celebrated search models. In the Wolinsky model
some consumers search beyond the ﬁrst ﬁrm and in this class of mod-
els costly second visits do make a substantive diﬀerence: equilibrium
prices under costly second visits can both be higher and lower than
their perfect recall analogues. In the oligopoly search model of Stahl
where consumers do not search beyond the ﬁrst ﬁrm, there remains
a unique symmetric equilibrium that has ﬁrms use pricing strategies
that are identical to the perfect recall case.
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11 Introduction
The main focus of consumer search theory is to analyze how market outcomes
are aﬀected if the cost consumers have to make to get information about the
prices and/or qualities ﬁrms oﬀer is explicitly taken into account. One of the
basic results of the extensive literature is that ﬁrms have some market power
that they can exploit even if there are many ﬁrms in the market and that
price dispersion emerges as a consequence of the fact that some ﬁrms aim at
selling to many consumers at low prices, while others make higher margins
over fewer customers (see, e.g., Stigler (1961) and Reinganum (1979)).
Most, if not all, of the consumer literature implicitly or explicitly makes
the assumption of perfect or free recall: consumers can always come back
to previously sampled ﬁrms without making a cost.1 One of the important
consequences of this assumption is that consumer search behavior is charac-
terized by one reservation price that is constant over time (Kohn and Shavell
(1974)): for any observed price sequence, consumers stop searching and buy
at the ﬁrm from which they received a price quote if that price is not larger
than this reservation price; otherwise they continue searching.2
The assumption of perfect recall is, so we argue in this paper, at odds with
the general philosophy of the consumer search literature which has search
frictions at its core. If consumers have to make a cost to go to a shop
in the ﬁrst place, then in almost any natural environment it is also costly
(in terms of time, eﬀort, or money) to go back to that shop. Even while
searching on the internet, where the costs of search are arguably lower than
in nonelectronic markets, it takes some mouse clicks and time to go back to
previously visited websites. In other words, in consumer search it is not only
important to remember the oﬀers previously received, but one also has to
make a cost to activate these oﬀers again.
In this paper we replace the perfect recall assumption by the more natu-
ral assumption of costly second visits, where the cost of going back to stores
previously sampled is explicitly modeled. In doing so we concentrate on the
implications for both the optimal consumer sequential search strategy and
1See, e.g., Reinganum (1979), Morgan and Manning (1985) , Stahl (1989) and Stahl
(1996) for early papers and Janssen et al. (2005), Tse (2006) and Waldeck (2008) for more
recent papers explicitly using the perfect recall assumption.
2An alternative setting is studied by Weitzman (1979). He considers the interesting
case where alternatives diﬀer in the cost of inspection as well as in the distribution of
revenues and he asks the question in which order the alternatives should be explored.
2the equilibrium pricing strategies of ﬁrms. Under costly second visits, we
show that consumer search is no longer characterized by a reservation price
that is constant over time. Instead, the reservation price at any moment in
time depends on (i) the number of ﬁrms that are not yet sampled and (ii)
the lowest price sampled so far. In particular, for a given lowest price in the
sample the reservation price is (weakly) decreasing in the number of ﬁrms
that are not yet sampled (increasing over time) and increasing in the mini-
mum price in the sample if this minimum price is not too large. Of course, if
no prices are sampled yet, the reservation price is just a constant (depending
on the number of ﬁrms that quote prices). Only when there are inﬁnitely
many prices to sample (in a perfectly competitive market), stationarity re-
appears and the reservation price in that case coincides with the reservation
price under perfect recall. Thus, one conclusion is that competitive search
models are robust to introducing costly second visits.
These two diﬀerences in the characterization of reservation prices have
important consequences for the actual search behaviour of consumers. Under
costly second visits it may very well happen that if consumers observe as
part of a price sequence two prices pt and pt+1, with pt < pt+1, they will
rationally decide to accept to buy at pt+1 and not at pt. This behaviour is
not possible under perfect recall and rational consumer behaviour. The main
reason for the fact that diﬀerent behaviours are possible is that under costly
second visits, no matter how small the cost of retrieving previously sampled
information, the search process is no longer stationary. In addition, the fewer
the number of ﬁrms not yet sampled, the worse the chance of observing a
low price if one continues searching. Together, this implies that the class of
search behaviours that are consistent with rational behaviour on the part of
consumers becomes much richer.
In contrast to the assumption of perfect recall commonly employed in the
literature on consumer search, many papers in the literature on job search
assume that only current oﬀers can be accepted as previous oﬀers that are not
accepted are foregone. Karni and Schwartz (1977) have interpreted these two
applications of search theory as making speciﬁc assumptions on the probabil-
ity with which past observations can be successfully retrieved: in consumer
search, the probability of successful retrieval is one, in job market search,
this probability is zero. They then go on to study situations with ”uncer-
tain recall”, where the probability that past observations can be successfully
retrieved is less than one but greater than zero (see also Landsberger and
Peleg (1977)). We interpret the diﬀerence between consumer search and job
3market search diﬀerently, namely in terms of the cost one has to make to
retrieve information. This cost is either zero or prohibitively high. We study
the intermediate case where the cost is positive, but not too high to make
it uninteresting to consider the option of going back to previously sampled
ﬁrms.3
Our next (main) question is how these changes in the optimal search
strategy impact on the optimal pricing behaviour of ﬁrms.4 Is the assump-
tion of perfect recall crucial for the analysis of search markets? The answer
to this question may depend on the particular industry setup considered. To
answer this question, we divide the class of sequential search models in two
subclasses: (i) models ”with true search”, i.e. models where in equilibrium
some consumers search beyond the ﬁrst ﬁrms, and (ii) models ”without true
search”, i.e. models where in equilibrium consumers stop at the ﬁrst alter-
native they observe. We ﬁrst analyze the implications of costly second visits
in the Wolinsky model as a celebrated example of the ﬁrst class of search
models distinguished. We show that in this model, the equilibrium pricing
behaviour of ﬁrms is aﬀected when we go beyond perfect recall. Since con-
sumers do search in these models, there are some options which are worse
than the reservation option value. Costly second visits do matter here as they
aﬀect the reservation prices and thus the expected demand from searching
consumers.
As an important example of the second class of search models, we use a
conventional model of oligopolistic competition with homogeneous goods and
sequential consumer search, which was pioneered by Stahl (1989). The distin-
guishing feature of the Stahl model is that there are two types of consumers,
informed and uninformed consumers. Informed consumers have zero search
cost and always buy the product at the lowest price in the market. Unin-
formed consumers have positive search cost and engage in optimal sequential
search. In the Stahl model N ﬁrms set prices simultaneously to maximize
3As far as we are aware, there is no paper studying this most relevant case. Kohn and
Shavell (1974) say that some of their results continue to hold if there is no possibility of
recall, but they also do not analyze the situation of costly recall. Some of the results of
Landsberger and Peleg (1977) are similar in nature to ours. Most notably that for every
search there is a time-dependent reservation price and that this price is constant in case of
perfect recall and inﬁnitely many ﬁrms. In the operations research literature Kang (1999)
studies an optimal stopping problem where the cost of a second visit is a percentage of the
utility derived from previous observations and arrives at a technical analysis that resembles
our analysis of the optimal search rule. See Section 2 for a more detailed comparison.
4An extensive overview of this literature has recently been given by Baye et al. (2006).
4proﬁts, where demand potentially comes from both types of consumers.
The surprising result we obtain for the Stahl (1989) model is that even
though the consumer’s search strategy is diﬀerent and more complicated, the
market equilibrium does not involve ﬁrms choosing diﬀerent pricing strate-
gies. We have two types of results that underline this general conclusion.
First, the symmetric equilibrium that is found by Stahl (1989) remains an
equilibrium. In this equilibrium ﬁrms choose a price from a price distribution
that is such that consumers with a positive search cost buy immediately in
the ﬁrst store they visit. Even the deﬁnition of the reservation price does
not need to be adjusted. This ﬁrst result is quite intuitive: at the reserva-
tion price (which is the upper bound of the price distribution) consumers are
indiﬀerent between buying immediately and continuing to search and buy
(with probability one) at the next store and thus consumers never consider
seriously to go back to previously visited stores. The second result is less
intuitive: we show there are no other types of symmetric equilibria. Thus,
the Stahl equilibrium remains the unique symmetric equilibrium if we allow
for costly second visits. With costly second visits in principle ﬁrms may ben-
eﬁt from setting prices above the reservation price of the ﬁrst search round.
The standard argument why ﬁrms will not set such prices is that a ﬁrm
that charges a price equal to the upper bound of the price distribution will
not sell to any consumer as even the uninformed consumers will continue
to search after observing such a price and have then at least two prices to
compare where the other price(s) are strictly smaller with probability one.
This argument does not hold with costly second visits as competitors that
are visited ﬁrst may have prices that are lower than the upper bound, but
not so much lower that it pays for consumers to pay the cost of going back to
these previously visited stores. At ﬁrst look one might think that if the val-
uation of the good is suﬃciently high ﬁrms can always compensate the low
probability of such event with suﬃciently high prices. We show, however,
that the structure of the proﬁt function is such that if ﬁrms charge prices
above ﬁrst round reservation prices, they can never compensate the loss of
demand with higher revenue per consumer.
Armstrong and Zhou (2010) give a particular interpretation of costly sec-
ond visits. They show that costly second visits can be re-interpreted as
buy-now discounts, i.e. as discounts consumers only get when they visit a
ﬁrm for the ﬁrst time: as soon as they walk out of the store without buying
the possibility to receive the discount disappears. The main diﬀerence be-
tween their paper and ours is that the buy-now discount in Armstrong and
5Zhou (2010) is a strategic variable chosen by ﬁrms, whereas in our model the
cost of a second visit to a ﬁrm is an exogenous feature of the search technol-
ogy. This means that our analysis may have various other applications, such
as in a search theoretic explanation for the existence of shopping malls (see
Non (2010)).
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 analyzes the
optimal sequential search behavior of consumers in a setting where they have
a ﬁnite number of objects to discover. Section 3 then investigates the impli-
cations of this optimal search rule for the Wolinsky (1986) model and Section
4 presents the results for the model of Stahl (1989). Section 5 concludes. All
technical proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Optimal Sequential Consumer Search
The environment we discuss in this section and that will be relevant in the
market setting discussed in the next two Sections is one where consumers
have a choice whether or not to buy one alternative out of a ﬁnite number
of alternatives. The utility each alternative delivers is unknown before con-
sumers investigates the properties of the alternative. Before inspection all
alternatives look the same, but ex post they are likely to be diﬀerent. The
notation we use in this Section is based on the idea that the alternatives only
diﬀer in price p, but this is not in anyway essential. Thus, we concentrate
on an environment where the alternative i has a price p that is distributed
according to the distribution function Fi(p) and Fi(p) = F(p) for all i. We
assume that F(p) is a continuous function and has a ﬁnite support. We deﬁne
p to be the lower bound of the support of the distribution and p be the upper
bound. Consumers engage in sequential search and get their ﬁrst price quo-
tation for free (following most of the literature),5 but any subsequent price
quotation comes at a search cost c. Consumers have unit demand and an
identical valuation for the good which we denote by v and v > c. If the con-
sumer decides to go back to the store she already visited before she incurs
costs b where 0 ≤ b ≤ c.
The main issue we are interested in in this section is how the presence
of costly second visits (b > 0) aﬀects the optimal search rule when F(p) is
known. Since the expected value of continuing to search depends on future
5Alternatively, we can easily incorporate the case where the ﬁrst search comes at a cost
as well.
6period expected values we use backward induction to analyze the optimal
stopping rule. To this end, deﬁne ps
k−1 as the smallest price in a sample of
k−1 prices previously sampled. We will argue that for each value of ps
k−1 there
is a unique value of pk such that an individual consumer is indiﬀerent between
buying at pk and either going back to one of the previously sampled ﬁrms
and buying there or continue searching. We denote this price by ρk(ps
k−1). If
pk ≤ ρk(ps
k−1), the consumer decides to buy at pk. Otherwise, he either buys
at ps
k−1 (if this price is relatively small) or continues to search.
The proof is by induction starting at the last ﬁrm. The following lemma
introduces the base of induction.
Lemma 2.1. Let F(p) be a distribution of prices. Then for k = N − 1 the
reservation price ρN−1 is uniquely deﬁned as a function of ps
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Moreover, if the consumer decides to continue searching, the continuation
cost of search, deﬁned as the additional net expected cost of continuing to
search conditional on optimal behaviour after the search is made, is given by
CN−1(p
s
N−1) = c + p
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The following picture illustrates the lemma.
The reservation price as a function of ps
N−2 is presented by the bold curves.
It is easy to see that this line consists of three parts:
(i) for ps
N−2 < ˜ p6 the best alternative to buying at pN−1 is to go back to
the lowest-priced ﬁrm in the sample so far. Thus, the reservation price is
determined by ρN−1 = ps
N−2 + b.
6We give a formal deﬁnition of ˜ p later.












(ii) for ˜ p ≤ ps
N−2 < p∗
N−1 the option to continue searching is always
preferred to the option of going back to the lowest-priced ﬁrm in the sample
so far. Thus, the consumer’s optimal choice is based on a comparison between
the current price and the expected continuation costs of continuing to search;
(iii) for the region ps
N−2 ≥ p∗
N−1 the situation is similar to the previous
case, except that the current price is always the lowest price in the sample so
far, implying that the continuation cost does not depend on ps
N−2. Therefore,
the reservation price is independent of ps
N−2 in this case.
Along the bold curve the consumer is indiﬀerent between buying now at
the shop he is currently visiting or either continuing to search or to go back
to the lowest-priced ﬁrm in the sample so far.
Since optimal search behaviour is completely determined by the pair
(pN−1,ps
N−2) we can characterize it in the same ﬁgure. Indeed, in region
A, which is bounded from below by ρN−1 and from the right by ˜ p, the con-
sumer always goes back and buys at the lowest-priced ﬁrm in the sample
so far. In region B, which is bounded from above by the reservation price,
the consumer always buys at the current shop. Finally in region C, which
is bounded from below by the reservation price and for which ps
N−2 > ˜ p, the
consumer always continues to search.
8Next we show that on any step 1 < k < N − 1 the reservation price
as a function of the lowest price in the sample is uniquely deﬁned and has
essentially the same shape as in Figure 3.1. The proof is by induction. Before
we give the formal statement of the result and the proof, we have to provide a
technical result that turns out to be useful in making the induction step. To
this end, assume that y is a random variable with a continuous distribution
function F(y). Let for a given search and return cost c and b, the following
function be deﬁned
C
∗(x) = P(y < min(x + b,C(min(x,y))))·
· E(y|y < min(x + b,C(min(x,y))))+
+ P(y ≥ min(x + b,C(min(x,y))))·
· E(min(x + b,C(min(x,y)))|y > min(x + b,C(min(x,y)))) + c.
.
(2.1)
The function C∗(x) can be interpreted as a generalized continuation cost of
additional search given continuation cost on the next step.









f(x + ∆x) − f(x)
∆x
Then the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2.2. If C(z) is a continuous function and for any z in he support
of F(·) 0 ≤ C−(z) ≤ C+(z) < 1 and C(y) > b, where y is the lower bound
of the support of F(y), then C∗(x) is a continuous function and for any x in
the support of F(·) except the lower bound, 0 ≤ C∗−(x) ≤ C∗+(x) < 1.7
Given these two lemmas, we are now ready to state and prove the main
result of the chapter. The result says that the reservation price as a function
of ps
k−1 is well-deﬁned and unique and a monotone function of ps
k−1. In later
7The result of Kang (1999) for the case where the costs of going back are a percentage
of utility observed is similar in nature to this lemma. His proof relies on convexity of the
value function, while we focus on the slope.
9results, we prove that the time- and history-dependency of these reservation
prices cannot be neglected, unlike the case of costless recall.
Theorem 2.3. The reservation price ρk(ps
k−1) is uniquely deﬁned for any k
and any ps
k−1 from the support of F(p). Moreover, the time- and history-
dependent reservation prices ρk(ps
k−1) are nondecreasing in ps
k−1.
Proof. The proof is by induction using Lemma 2.1 as induction base and
Lemma 2.2 for the induction step. See the Appendix for details.
The proof of the theorem basically shows that the function ρk+1(ps
k) is
deﬁned over three separate intervals and essentially looks like the reserva-
tion price for the last step (see Figure 3.1). When ps
k−1 is relatively small
ρk(ps
k−1) = ps




and for higher values ρk(ps
k−1) is independent of ps
k−1. One can thus, deﬁne
a price ˜ pk as the price such that on step k the consumer is indiﬀerent be-
tween going back to the shop charging this price and continuing to search,
i.e., ˜ pk + b = Ck(˜ pk).
We are now in the position to prove some special properties of the reser-
vation price function that turn out useful in the next section. To this end,






By considering the limiting case where the cost of recall is zero we provide
more insight into the reason why the cases of perfect recall and costly second
visits are so diﬀerent from one another. Moreover, the reservation price under
perfect recall turns out to play an important role in further characterizing
the optimal search behaviour under costly second visits.






8As this fact is intuitively obvious the proof is available upon request.
10Under perfect recall, the search rule is stationary, but (interestingly)
slightly diﬀerent from what is commonly thought as in any period the reser-
vation price is still dependent on the lowest of previously sampled prices.
When the current price is smaller than any of the previously sampled prices,
then the consumer simply compares the current price with ρpr and decides
whether or not to buy. If the current price is larger, the consumer simply
forgets about the current price. Because of stationarity, previously sampled
prices are in a full model including price setting behaviour of the ﬁrms, ir-
relevant. Either these previously sampled prices are below ρpr, but then the
consumer simply does not continue to search, or they are above ρpr, but then
the consumer never considers buying there unless he has visited all the stores
and knows for sure that there are no lower prices in the sample.9
To further characterize the optimal search rule, under costly second visits
we show that the price ˜ pk is intimately related to the price ρpr under perfect
recall.
Proposition 2.5. For all k, ˜ pk ≡ ˜ p = ρpr − b.
Next, we show that rational consumers never use the option of going back
to previously sampled stores, unless they have visited every store available.
This result is especially useful in the context of the analysis of the Wolinsky
model with costly second visits in the next section.
Corollary 2.6. Assume the consumer behaved optimally on all steps 1 ≤
k ≤ K. Then if K < N, it is never optimal for this consumer to go back.
Next, we show that reservation prices are non-decreasing over time. In
particular, if a price smaller than ˜ p = ρpr − b is sampled before, then the
reservation price is simply ρk(ps
k−1) = ps





k−1). However, if a price strictly larger than ˜ p = ρpr−b is
the lowest price in the sample so far, then ρk+1(ps
k) > ρk(ps
k−1). Thus, under
costly second visits reservation prices are essentially nonstationary.
9However, in equilibrium even this could not be the case with b = 0 as then the
traditional argument kicks in that no ﬁrm wants to charge the highest price above ρpr as
no consumer will ever buy at this price, implying that no ﬁrm will want to choose a price
above ρpr.










k−1 such that ps
k = ps
k−1 > ˜ p = ρpr − b .
Knowing that reservation prices are non-decreasing in the search round,
we next establish a relationship between the highest and the lowest reserva-
tion prices implying that they cannot be more than a factor 2 apart.
Lemma 2.8. For any p in the support of F(p)
ρN−1(p)+b
ρpr < 2.







Corollary 2.9. ∀k ∈ (2,N) :
ρk(p)+b
ρ1 < 2
We ﬁnally consider the limiting case (of perfect competition) where there
are potentially inﬁnitely many prices to sample. As the time dependency of
the reservation prices disappears due to the fact that now the cost of contin-
uing to search is independent of time, i.e., ρk(ps
k−1) = ρk+1(ps
k). For prices be-
low ˜ p, we knew already that this equality holds. Interestingly, with inﬁnitely
many ﬁrms and previously sampled prices above ˜ p, the reservation prices be-
comes independent of previously sampled prices and equal to the reservation
price under perfect recall. Thus, the cost of going back to previously sampled
ﬁrms does not play an important role under perfect competition.
Proposition 2.10. Let K ∈ N. Then for any p ≥ ˜ p limN→∞ ρK(p) = ρpr.
Thus, under perfect competition the reservation price under costly second
visits is exactly identical to the case where consumers have perfect recall.
We end this Section by providing a numerical example to illustrate some
features of the reservation prices. The example clearly shows that it can be
rational to accept a price in a future period even if a lower price has been
observed in the past.
Consider the uniform distribution of prices on [0,100]. Assume there are
4 ﬁrms in the market, search costs c are equal to 5 and the costs of going back
12to a previously sampled ﬁrm b equals 3. The reservation prices after visiting
no, one and two ﬁrms as well as the reservation price under perfect recall
are presented in Figure 2. In this case, the reservation price under perfect
recall equals approximately 31.62, while the reservation price before visiting
any shop under costly second visits equals 32.90. Thus, if a consumer faces,
say, a price of 33 in the ﬁrst period he decides to continue searching. From
Figure 2 it is clear, however, that if the third price the consumer encounters
is say 34 it is optimal for him to stop.
Figure 2: Simulation Results for Uniform Distribution .
Parameters of simulation: N = 4,b = 3,c = 5.
The ﬁgure also illustrates most of the results we proved in the previous
section. In particular, it is easy to observe that all reservation price functions
are non-decreasing in ps
k (Theorem 2.3) , and that the sequence of reservation
prices is non-decreasing in the number of ﬁrms left, and strictly increasing
for all prices above ˜ p (Proposition 2.7).
3 A Wolinsky-type Model with Costly Sec-
ond Visits
After we have deﬁned the optimal search behaviour of consumers it is natural
to look at the equilibrium implications of such a behaviour and ask whether
13costly second visits imply diﬀerent ﬁrm behaviour in equilibrium. In this
Section we study the Wolinsky (1986) model as a prominent example of a
model with true search where some consumers search beyond the ﬁrst option.
the next Section deals with the Stahl model as an example of a search model
where no consumer with positive search cost searches beyond the ﬁrst ﬁrm.
We make a few innocuous simpliﬁcations to the Model of Wolinsky (1986)
in order to focus on our main point – the inﬂuence of costly second visits on
equilibrium outcomes. Each of N ﬁrms can produce a single distinct brand.
All the ﬁrms have identical cost functions C(x) = F + C · x, where x is the
quantity of goods sold. There is a unit mass of consumers and each consumer
is interested in buying one unit of the product and also derives utility from
consuming the numeraire good x0. The utility function of consumers is given
by u(x0,i) = x0 + vi, where vi is a value attached by a consumer to brand i.
The vi’s are realizations of independent and identically distributed variables
with distribution function G with ﬁnite support [v,v]. Given the utility
function it is clear that consumers are interested in maximizing the surplus
vi − pi. Consumers are not informed about the prices and values vi before
they search a particular ﬁrm. The search process is costly with cost c. We
supplement this assumption with the assumption of costly second visits: in
order to return to a previously sampled ﬁrm consumers have to pay b. We
look for the symmetric equilibrium of the model, where all ﬁrms charge price
p∗.
Though our search results are formulated in terms of costs and prices, they
can be easily interpreted in terms of values and utilities. From Theorem 2.3 it
follows that the optimal stopping rule is characterized by a set of reservation
utility functions ωi(vb
i−1−p∗), where vb
i is the best utility so far. Each moment
a consumer compares the current option (vi−pi) with the reservation utility
ωi(vb
i−1 − p∗) and makes her decision. We denote the reservation utility in
the ﬁrst search round by ω1 without arguments, since there is no history on
which to condition the decision.
Now we construct the demand function for a ﬁrm and show that it diﬀers
from the demand function of the original model. Note, that Corollary 2.6
simpliﬁes the solution a lot: we do not need to consider the possibility a
consumer returns to previously visited ﬁrms until all ﬁrms are visited.
Demand for a ﬁrm that charges a price p given the equilibrium price p∗
comes from four diﬀerent sources. First, some consumers (randomly) come to
the ﬁrm in their ﬁrst search round and immediately buy (if the match value




[1 − G(w1 + p)].
Second, other consumers come to the ﬁrm for the ﬁrst time after the ﬁrst
search round but before the last search round and then buy immediately
















This expression represents the fact that along the search path each of
the utilities of consuming the good provided by a ﬁrm before visiting the
particular ﬁrm in question was smaller than the corresponding (step and
history dependent) reservation utility, while the current utility level is larger
than the appropriate optimal stopping level.
Third, some consumers come to the ﬁrm in the last search round. Here
the following conditions have to be satisﬁed. First, the oﬀer is acceptable and,
second, not more than b worse than any other oﬀer. These two conditions
determine the lower limit of the ﬁrst integral as, ﬁrst, vi must be larger than
p and, second, the current oﬀer must be more attractive than going back to
any previous oﬀer, i.e., vb
N−1 − p∗ − b < vi − p, or vi > vb
N−1 − p∗ − b + p.
Thirdly, all other oﬀers along the search path have to be rejected yielding














Fourth, some consumers were at the ﬁrm but left it and decided to return
back later. Let us denote si = maxj<i(vj − pj), s1 = 0. Assuming that the
ﬁrm we are interested in was visited on search round i this implies that the
following three conditions are satisﬁed. Firstly, all other ﬁrms except the
last one provide worse alternatives and were rejected on the previous search
rounds: vj < min(ωj(sj),vi −pi +p∗) for all j 6= i and j 6= N. Secondly, ﬁrm
i was rejected on round i (vi < ωi(si)), but the oﬀer is in principle acceptable
(vi ≥ p). Thirdly, the last ﬁrm gives an oﬀer which is worse than the oﬀer of


















The resulting expression for a ﬁrm’s demand is
D(p,p
∗) = I1 + I2 + I3 + I4.
Obviously the resulting demand function is quite diﬀerent from the result
obtained by Wolinsky (1986) (see formula 5 in that paper): the result by
Wolinsky can be obtained by substituting b = 0 and a stationary reservation
price in the demand function. In particular the demand is higher for any
given pair (p,p∗), however the equilibrium price is not necessarily higher.
With or without costly second visits, the equilibrium price is determined by
p




and so the slope of the demand function together with the demand itself
determine the equilibrium prices.10 Inspection of the above expressions re-
veals that it is extremely diﬃcult to get analytical results for the Wolinsky
model with costly second visits. To show that the equilibrium prices under
costly second visits are indeed diﬀerent from the Wolinsky paper (i.e. it is
not just that the formula looks diﬀerent) we have performed a numerical
analysis for the case where the utilities are uniformly distributed over [a0,1]
and N = 2.11 The table below shows for diﬀerent values of the search cost
parameter c the equilibrium prices for the Wolinsky model (where b = 0) and
our model for diﬀerent values of b.
The table reveals a few interesting facts. First, it conﬁrms the overall
result that equilibrium prices are increasing in search cost, i.e., even at pos-
itive cost of second visits, equilibrium prices are clearly increasing in search
cost (whether it is measured keeping the ratio of b to c ﬁxed, or whether
only b is ﬁxed and the impact of the cost of the ﬁrst visit is investigated).
10We thank Jidong Zhou for pointing out and illustrating this fact.
11The model can be solved numerically for higher values of N, but for each higher value
of N even the numerical solution becomes harder to calculate and requires to set up a
diﬀerent algorithm for each N.
16Table 1: The equilibrium price as a function of c,b
c/b 0 0.2c 0.4c 0.6c 0.8c 1.0c
0.05 0.429900 0.431155 0.432282 0.433290 0.434186 0.434978
0.10 0.443128 0.444777 0.446062 0.447014 0.447655 0.448005
0.15 0.454977 0.456583 0.457524 0.457852 0.457609 0.456828
0.20 0.465919 0.467188 0.467426 0.466709 0.465098 0.462639
0.25 0.476211 0.476915 0.476157 0.474039 0.470640 0.466018
Second, and more surprising, the impact of costly second visits the equilib-
rium price as a function of b can be both increasing (for small values of c),
and non-monotone (for larger values of c) with equilibrium prices becoming
decreasing in b when b becomes relatively large.
We conclude that the introduction of costly second visits changes the
equilibrium outcomes in the model with true search and these models are
therefore not robust to the introduction of costly second visits.
4 The Stahl model with costly second visits
In this section we analyse the question whether costly second visits imply
diﬀerent equilibrium behaviour of ﬁrms in models where under perfect recall
consumers do not search beyond the ﬁrst ﬁrm. To do so, we focus on the
celebrated model by Stahl (1989).
Recall that Stahl (1989) considers a market where N ﬁrms produce a
homogenous good and have identical production costs, which we normalize
to zero. Each ﬁrm decides upon the price at which it is going to sell the good
in the market. There are two types of consumers in the market. A fraction
λ of all consumers are “shoppers”, i.e. these consumers like shopping or
have zero search costs for other reasons. We assume that these consumers
know all prices in the market and buy at the ﬁrm with the lowest price.
The remaining fraction 1 − λ of consumers is uninformed. These consumers
engage in sequential search and get their ﬁrst price quotation for free. They
will search optimally in the way analyzed in Section 2. The timing in the
model is simple: ﬁrst, ﬁrms simultaneously decide on their prices, where
the strategy of ﬁrm i is described by Fi(p). Stahl (and we) concentrate on
symmetric equilibria where Fi(p) = F(p) for all i.
We start with the question whether a “Stahl-type” of pricing strategy, i.e.
17where all ﬁrms play mixed strategies with the support up to ﬁrst round reser-
vation price is indeed an equilibrium in the model with costly second visits.
Then we proceed with the investigation whether other types of equilibria are
possible.
Our ﬁrst result states that the “Stahl-type” of equilibrium is also an
equilibrium in the model with costly second visits.
Proposition 4.1. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium where all ﬁrms
charge prices below the ﬁrst-round reservation price, which equals the reser-
vation price under perfect recall ρpr.
We can explain this result as follows. Since nobody searched with per-
fect recall, the upper bound of the price distribution (the worst option for
consumers) was not worse than the reservation price (value) under perfect
recall. Thus, provided that ﬁrms stick to the same strategy, all the reser-
vation prices under costly second visits are equal to the reservation price
with perfect recall. Therefore, none of the ﬁrms individually has a proﬁtable
deviation.
Now, using the results from section 2 we can formally prove the idea
that there are no other symmetric equilibria than the Stahl equilibrium. For
such an equilibrium to exist it must be the case that the upper bound of the
price distribution is strictly larger ρpr. To simplify notation we introduce the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let’s denote rk to be the maximum possible reservation price
in the k-th search round, i.e., rk = maxp ρk(p).
The claim that there are no other symmetric equilibria is now proved
in three consecutive steps. Lemma 4.3 shows that there are no equilibria
where the upper bound of the support is smaller than to rN−1. Lemma 4.4
shows that there are no equilibria where the upper bound of the support is
in between rN−1 and rN−1 + b). Finally, Lemma 4.5 shows that there are no
equilibria where the upper bound of the support is above rN−1 + b.
Lemma 4.3. There is no equilibrium price distribution with r1 < p < rN−1.
Now we analyze the “intermediate” case where the upper bound would
be p ∈ [rN−1,rN−1 + b]. The proof of this Lemma is based on the fact that
in order to compensate ﬁrms for the loss in demand resulting from charging
above rN−1, the upper bound of the distribution has to be above 2r1−b, which
18contradicts the relationship between reservation prices that is consistent with
the search perspective as established Lemma 2.8.
Lemma 4.4. There is no equilibrium price distribution with p ∈ [rN−1,rN−1+
b].
Finally, we analyze the case where the upper bound is quite well above
the highest reservation price. This part of the overall proof is the most
complicated part. The idea of the proof is that if the upper bound of the
support is larger that the highest reservation price, it is anyway bounded from
above due to the structure of the upper part of the support of an equilibrium
price distribution. This gives an upper bound on the proﬁts ﬁrms receive
from choosing a price equal to the upper bound. On the other hand, we
argue that a price equal to the ﬁrst-round reservation price should also be
charged in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that this ﬁrst-round reservation
price should be larger than some lower bound, creating some lower bound
on equilibrium proﬁts. The last part of the proof shows that the upper
bound we construct is smaller than the constructed lower bound yielding an
inconsistency.
Lemma 4.5. There is no equilibrium price distribution with p > rN−1 + b.
These three Lemmas together allow us to state that the “Stahl” equilib-
rium is the unique symmetric equilibrium in the model.
Theorem 4.6. The unique symmetric equilibrium in the model with costly
second visits is the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4.1.
5 Conclusions
Consumer search models have assumed that consumers have costless access
to prices in stores they already visited, but have to pay a search cost to
visit the store in the ﬁrst place. We have argued that this assumption is
often not justiﬁed and that when there are search cost for visiting a store in
the ﬁrst place, there are also (smaller) costs of going back to a store (second
visits). We have shown that without the assumption of costless second visits,
the optimal sequential search rule is no longer characterized by a unique,
stationary reservation price. Instead, the reservation price in a particular
19search round is a function of the number of ﬁrms that are still not-visited
and the lowest price sampled so far.
We have studied the implications of costly second visits for two strands
of literature, one where -under perfect recall- in the market equilibrium ﬁrms
price in such a way that some consumers do search beyond the ﬁrst ﬁrm
and another class where no consumer does so. In the ﬁrst class of search
models, inspired by Wolinsky (1983), costly second visits imply a change in
the equilibrium behavior of ﬁrms where costly second visits may imply both
higher and lower equilibrium prices.
In the class of models ”without true search” we have shown for the cele-
brated paper by Stahl (1989) that the equilibrium analysis is robust to the
assumption of costly second visits. Our analysis shows that the equilibrium
analyzed by Stahl remains an equilibrium under the alternative assumption
of costly second visits and that, in addition, there do not exist other possible
symmetric equilibrium outcomes in the oligopolistic competition setup. Even
though the optimal search behaviour of the consumers can be very compli-
cated, ﬁrms behave in such a way that they do not charge prices above the
ﬁrst search round reservation price. The main reason for this ﬁnding is that
if a ﬁrm charges a price above this ﬁrst search round reservation price, it
loses relatively so many consumers that this loss in demand can never be
suﬃciently compensated by the increase in price.
20Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 2.1. Let F(p) be a distribution of prices. Then for k = N − 1 the
reservation price ρN−1 is uniquely deﬁned as a function of ps







N−2 + b, c + p
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N−1 satisﬁes the equation
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Moreover, if the consumer decides to continue searching, the continuation
cost of search, deﬁned as the additional net expected cost of continuing to
search conditional on optimal behaviour after the search is made, is given by
CN−1(p
s
N−1) = c + p
s





Proof. We consider the situation where N − 2 ﬁrms have been sampled and
the consumer has decided to make one more search. In this case, the con-
sumer has three options: to buy now at the newly observed price pN−1, to
buy now at lowest price among the previously sampled prices ps
N−2, or to
continue searching. Knowing the value of min(pN−1,ps
N−2), the last option
gives an expected value of










Let us ﬁrst concentrate on the case where pN−1 ≥ ps
N−2. In this case the pay-
oﬀ of continuing to search does not depend on pN−1 so that the reservation
price is given by the point where the consumer is either (i) indiﬀerent between
buying now at pN−1 or buying at ps
N−2 (and paying the additional cost of
going back b) or (ii) indiﬀerent between buying now at pN−1 and continue
21searching. In the ﬁrst case ρN−1(ps
N−2) = ps
N−2 + b; in the second case
ρN−1(p
s
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It is easily seen that the ﬁrst-order derivative of this expression w.r.t. ps
N−2
is positive and strictly smaller than 1. Moreover, it is easily seen that at
ps
N−2 = p, this expression equals ps
N−2+c > ps
N−2+b. Hence, by continuity, for
small values of ps
N−2 the reservation price is given by ρN−1(ps
N−2) = ps
N−2+b.
For larger values of ps
N−2 it is ρN−1(ps
N−2) = c + ps




at least when ρN−1(ps
N−2) is still larger than ps
N−2.
Let us next concentrate on the case where pN−1 ≤ ps
N−2. In this case
the consumer will never go back to previously sampled prices and thus the
reservation price is implicitly characterized by the price that solves
pN−1 = c+E(pN|pN < pN−1 +b)F(pN−1 +b)+(1−F(pN−1 +b))(pN−1 +b).
Because of continuity at pN−1 = ps




N−2+b, the derivative of the reservation price is strictly smaller than 1, and
the fact that left diﬀerentiability holds at pN−1 = ps
N−2, we should have that
there is exactly one pN−1 that solves the above equation. This implies that
in the region where pN−1 ≤ ps
N−2, ρN−1(ps
N−2) is independent of ps
N−2. Thus,
also in this case ρN−1(ps
N−2) is uniquely deﬁned and non-decreasing in ps
N−2.
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22Lemma 2.2. If C(z) is a continuous function and for any z in he support
of F(·) 0 ≤ C−(z) ≤ C+(z) < 1 and C(y) > b, where y is the lower bound
of the support of F(y), then C∗(x) is a continuous function and for any x in
the support of F(·) except the lower bound, 0 ≤ C∗−(x) ≤ C∗+(x) < 1.
Proof. Continuity follows immediately from the deﬁnition of C∗.
Consider the following inequality: y < min(x + b,C(min(x,y))). Since
C+(z) < 1, this inequality can be rewritten in the form y < g(x) = min(x +
b,C(x),a), where a satisﬁes equation a = C(a). It is clear that g+(x) ≤ 1.
Thus, we can rewrite C∗ in the following form:
C
∗(x) = P(y < g(x))E[y|y < g(x)]+
+ P(y ≥ g(x))E[min(x + b,C(min(x,y)))|y ≥ g(x)] + c
Now note, that if x ≤ a then given that y ≥ g(x) we get min(x +
b,C(min(x,y)) = min(x+b,C(x)) which is just g(x) for x < a. Then we get
C









yf(y)dy + (1 − F(g(x)))g(x)
!+
=
= [g(x)f(g(x)) + (1 − F(g(x))) − g(x)f(g(x))]g
+(x) = [1 − F(g(x))]g
+(x) < 1.
with the second equality coming from the continuity of g(x). It is also
clear that C∗− ≥ 0.
Another case is if x > a. Here, given y ≥ g(x)we get min(x+b,C(min(x,y)) =
C(min(x,y)). Then we get
C













Now, because of the continuity of g(x) and C(x) again we get
C
∗+(x) = [g(x)f(g(x)) − C(g(x))f(g(x))]g
+(x) + C
+(x)(1 − F(x))




+(x)(1 − F(x)) < 1
In the same way
C
∗− = C
−(x)(1 − F(x)) < 1
which completes the proof since C−(x) ≥ 0,1 − F(x) ≥ 0.
Theorem 2.3. The reservation price ρk(ps
k−1) is uniquely deﬁned for any k
and any ps
k−1 from the support of F(p). Moreover, the time- and history-
dependent reservation prices ρk(ps
k−1) are nondecreasing in ps
k−1.
Proof. Let Ck(ps
k) be a continuation cost of additional search on the k-th step
given realizations of (ps
k−1,pk) (recall that ps
k = min(ps
k−1,pk)). Then, given
the optimal search behaviour of the consumer, Ck(ps
k) is the expected payoﬀ
of two events: either the consumer buys at the next ﬁrm to be searched (ﬁrst



































k) < 1. The proof is by back-







N−1) < 1, thus the base of induction is proven. We will now argue
that this property also holds for any other period. For proving the induction
step we can apply lemma 2.2 by substituting in the equation (2.1) x = ps
k,
y = pk+1, C∗(x) = Ck(ps




























k−1)), which is well-deﬁned and unique. Moreover, it is
non-decreasing in ps
k−1 since both ps
k−1 + b and Ck(ps
k) are non-decreasing in
ps
k−1. If, on the other hand, pk < ps
k−1, then the reservation price is a solution
to the equation pk = Ck(pk), which is unique since Ck(pk) has a slope strictly
smaller than 1. In this case, the reservation price does not depend on ps
k−1
and is thus nondecreasing in ps
k−1.
Proposition 2.5. For all k, ˜ pk = ˜ p = ρpr − b.
Proof. Note that the price ˜ pk is deﬁned such that after visiting k stores, the
consumer is indiﬀerent between continuing searching and going back to the
lowest-priced store in the sample so far. Therefore, at ˜ pk the reservation price
ρk(˜ pk) = ˜ pk + b. The expected costs of continuing to search are:
c + F(˜ pk + b)E(pk+1|pk+1 < ˜ pk + b) + (1 − F(˜ pk + b))(˜ pk + b)
By equating it to the best current option (˜ pk+b) and some simpliﬁcations





It follows therefore that ˜ pk does not depend on k and that (by comparing
this equation to the deﬁnition of ρpr) it is actually just equal to ρpr − b.
Corollary 2.6. Assume the consumer behaved optimally on all steps 1 ≤
k ≤ K. Then if K < N, it is never optimal for this consumer to go back.
25Proof. Note, that the option of going back is preferred to continue searching
or stopping only if ps
K < ˜ p. On the ﬁrst step any price p1 ≤ ρpr would be
accepted immediately. So, if the consumer continued his search it must be
the case that p1 > ρpr. Given ps
1 > ρpr on the second step any price p2 ≤ ρpr
also would be accepted immediately. Thus, if consumer continued his search
it must be the case that p2 > ρpr. Then by induction if customer reached
step K it must be the case that for any 1 ≤ k ≤ K it was the case that
pk > ρpr. Therefore ps
K > ρpr > ˜ p and it is never optimal to go back, except
possibly at the last step.










k−1 such that ps
k = ps
k−1 > ˜ p = ρpr − b .
Proof. Note, that the reservation price essentially represents the cost of the
next-best available alternative to buying now at the shop the consumer is
currently visiting. If the next-best available alternative is to go back to the
lowest-priced ﬁrm in the sample before visiting this shop, i.e., ps
k−1 < ˜ p the





Now consider the case where the next-best available alternative is to
continue searching. Let {ρk(ps
k−1)}N
k=1 be the sequence of the reservation
price functions. Consider the following suboptimal strategy. If on step k the
consumer makes a decision to visit one more ﬁrm he either buys at the ﬁrm
he visits at step k+1 or continues his search but forgets about this ﬁrm later
on (thus, he never comes back to that ﬁrm). Let us denote a reservation






On the other hand for any ps

















which completes the proof.
Lemma 2.8. For any p in the support of F(p)
ρN−1(p)+b
ρpr < 2.
26Proof. Lemma 2.1 states that
ρN−1(p) = min
 









N−1 satisﬁes the equation
p
∗









Note, that ﬁrst, ρN−1(p) ≤ p∗
N−1, and, second, p∗
N−1 satisﬁes the equation










From (5.1) and (5.2) it follows that p∗
N−1 + b < 2ρpr. Indeed, if this were











F(p)dp > c, (5.3)
which contradicts the assumption b < c. The second inequality stems
from the fact that F(p) in a non-decreasing function, the last form the deﬁ-
nition of ρpr. Therefore p∗
N−1+b < 2ρpr and since ρN−1(p) ≤ p∗
N−1 the lemma
is proved.
Proposition 2.10. Let K ∈ N. Then for any p ≥ ˜ p limN→∞ ρK(p) = ρpr.
Proof. Note, that for any p ≥ ˜ p, CN−1(p) is ﬁxed and does not depend on
N. On the other hand for any p ≥ ˜ p we have
Ck(p) = F(ρk+1(p))E(pk+1|pk+1 < ρk+1(p)) +
+ (1 − F(ρk+1(p))E(Ck+1(pk+1)|pk+1 ≥ ρk+1(p)) ≤
≤ C
0
k(p) = F(ρk+1(p))E(pk+1|pk+1 < ρk+1(p)) + (1 − F(ρk+1(p))ρk+1(p)
27Note, that C0
k(p) can be rewritten in the form:
C
0




Therefore, following our notation
C
0+
k (p) = ρ
+












As 1 − F(ρi+1(p)) < 1 for any p > ˜ p and i > K (note, that ρi+1(p) <





K (p) = 0.
.
Now note that from proposition 3.5 it follows that ρK(˜ p) = ρpr and there-
fore CK(˜ p) = ρpr. Therefore, since C0
K(p) is a continuous function we get












Proposition 4.1. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium where all ﬁrms
charge prices below the ﬁrst-round reservation price, which equals the reser-
vation price under perfect recall ρpr.
Proof. If the upper bound of the support p = ρ1, then maxp ρ1(p) = ... =
maxp ρN−1(p) = ρpr. Therefore, the equilibrium deﬁned in Stahl (1989) is
an equilibrium if none of the ﬁrms has a proﬁtable deviation. The only
(potentially proﬁtable) way for ﬁrms to deviate is to charge prices above
ρ1. However, then this ﬁrm has a zero demand both from informed and
uninformed consumers. Therefore, a proﬁtable deviation does not exist, and
the Stahl type of equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
28Lemma 4.3. There is no equilibrium price distribution with r1 < p < rN−1.
Proof. It is easy to see that given the optimal search behavior all reserva-
tion prices are below or equal to the upper bound of the support of the
distribution. Indeed, suppose p < rN−1. Recall, that









and therefore rN−1 = ρpr, which is not possible.
Lemma 4.4. There is no equilibrium price distribution with p ∈ [rN−1,rN−1+
b].
Proof. First, consider proﬁts at r1 and at p:






π(p) = Y p
It is clear, that S ≥ 2−F(r1). If ﬁrm charges p > rN−1 it only sells some-
thing, if all other ﬁrms set prices at least above r1 (otherwise all consumers
stop on the ﬁrst step). Therefore, Y < (1 − F(r1))N−1 < (1 − F(r1)). Then
it should be that
1 − λ
N
(2 − F(r1))r1 <
1 − λ
N
(1 − F(r1))p ≤
1 − λ
N
(1 − F(r1))(rN−1 + b)
and therefore
rN−1+b
r1 > 2 which contradicts Corollary 2.9.
Thus, the proposition is proved.
Lemma 4.5. There is no equilibrium price distribution with p > rN−1 + b.
29Proof. Let π0 be the equilibrium proﬁts. First, consider the proﬁts of a ﬁrm
that charges p. As, by construction, p is in the support of the equilibrium




(1 − F(p − b))
N−1p (5.4)
As p > rN−1 + b, a ﬁrm charging p does not get any informed consumers
and only those uninformed consumers who have ﬁrst visited all other ﬁrms,
have observed these ﬁrms charge prices above rN−1 and then do not want to
go back to these stores because of the cost of a second visit b. If a ﬁrm would
charge p − b instead, its proﬁts would be at least equal to









which is larger than or equal to









Whether or not p−b is in the support of the equilibrium price distribution,
it should be the case that π0 is larger than or equal to this expression, yielding
p ≤




π0 < φ(λ,N) ≡ (1 − λ)
1 − λ + λN
λN2 b (5.6)
this is the upper bound on the equilibrium proﬁt. Next, we will construct
a lower bound on the equilibrium proﬁt. To this end, consider proﬁts at
r1. It is easy to see that r1 should be in the support of the equilibrium
price distribution. Firstly, by deﬁnition of r1 it cannot be the case that the
whole price distribution lies above r1. Secondly, if there is part (or whole) of
probability distribution which lies below r1, then there is proftable deviation
from the largest price in this part of the support to r1, since demand does
not change between this to points. To simplify notation, let F(r1) = m. We
then have that





30where S ≥ 1 is the total probability that a consumer buys from the ﬁrm,
arising form all possible search paths of consumers. The ﬁrm charging r1
gets at least 1/N consumers who randomly arrive at its store in the ﬁrst
search round and N−1
N
1
N−1(1−m) of consumers who ﬁrst visit another store,
observe a price strictly larger than r1 and then randomly visits the store
under consideration. thus, it follows that S ≥ 2 − m. Therefore, for any
p ≤ r0 in the equilibrium support:


















Nλ(1 − m)N−1 + (1 − λ)S
Nλ + (1 − λ)S
r1.
Now consider a family of probability distributions:














F(p;K)dp = c + b,
then we get that the solution of this equation r1(K) is an increasing
function of K, because p(r1(K)) is linearly increasing in r1(K) with slope less
than 1 and F(p,K) is decreasing in K. Therefore, r1(2) ≤ r1(K) for any K.
It is also clear that r1(K) is increasing in c, therefore, r1(2)|c=b ≤ r1(2)|c>b.




































As r∗ ≤ r1 for any N,b,c and ﬁxed S,m it follows that
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Nλ(1 − (1 − m)N−1)
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λ(1 − (1 − m)N−1) −
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This is the lower bound on equilibrium proﬁts. It is straightforward to verify
that ∂
∂Sψ0(λ,m,N,S) > 0 and because S ≥ 2 − m we get that
π0 ≥ ψ0(λ,m,N,S) > ψ(λ,m,N) ≡ ψ0(λ,m,N,2 − m).
32Now, since π0 < φ(λ,N) and π0 > ψ(λ,m,N) the equilibrium can only
exist if the lower bound on proﬁts is smaller than the upper bound, or
ξ(λ,m,N) ≡ φ(λ,N) − ψ(λ,m,N) > 0.







1 − λ + λN
λN2 −
λ
Nλ − (1 − λ)ln 1−λ+Nλ
1−λ
. (5.8)
Therefore ξ(λ,m,N) > 0 only if the denominator of the second fraction
in (5.8) is negative, which is equivalent to
ln






or, the denominator is positive, but the expression still holds, which is equiv-
alent to
ln




1 − λ + Nλ
. (5.10)
Let us start with (5.9). It is clear that at λ = 0 both the right hand side











Thus, the left hand side of (5.9) increases slower than the right hand side,
and thus (5.9) can never hold.
Now we proceed with (5.10). Again, at λ = 0 both the right hand side
and the left hand side of (5.10) equal to 0. If we take the derivative of the











Therefore, the left hand side of (5.10) increases faster than the right hand
side, and so (5.10) cannot hold either. Therefore, there is no equilibrium with
p > rN−1.
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